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Abstract There appears to be an irresolvable disagreement between ‘‘progressives’’ and
‘‘conservatives’’ regarding the ultimate aims of education. This paper argues that the
dispute is irresolvable as it currently stands because the traditional progressive/conserva-
tive dichotomies are false and based on distorted half-truths. The current impasse is due to
the fact that educationalists and philosophers alike have hitherto misunderstood the fun-
damental purpose of educational activities. The central claim of this paper is that a bio-
logical perspective on education allows one to see past the traditional dichotomies and
affords a coherent rationale for a set of curricular priorities by providing the framework
necessary to draw principled distinctions between education, training, indoctrination, and
enculturation, all without having to draw on contentious politico-ideological commitments.
Keywords Aims of education  Philosophy of the curriculum 
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‘‘…the Confederation of Kitchwa Peoples of Ecuador… is campaigning with a
picture which shows a bulldozer coming to erase a village to make way for a mining
project. The man in the bulldozer says to a farmer: ‘You are poor. Sell me your land
and water so that you will get money’, to which the farmer responds: ‘When the
money will be gone, I shall have no water and no land.’ To which the man in the
bulldozer replies: ‘Uneducated!’’’1
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Introduction
What is it to be educated? Assuming that education has something to do with knowledge
and skills, what does one need to know, or be able to do, in order to be educated? And how
does being educated differ from being trained, or indoctrinated, or socialised, or otherwise
inculcated with the values, mores and culture of one’s social group? These first-order
questions naturally lead to a second-order question: Are the propositions expressing
putative answers to these first-order questions truth-apt? It is certainly not obvious to
everyone that they are. It might very well be that there is no qualitative difference between
being educated and being trained or indoctrinated, and that the term is simply a way of
marking our approval, perhaps for ideological reasons, of a particular schooling program.
Another way of expressing this point is to say that the ultimate aims of education might be
entirely a matter of subjective value judgement, or a ‘‘social construct’’, there being no way
to assess objectively the merits of any educational programme. A less cynical thought is
that ‘‘being educated’’, despite being a real quality, might be context dependent. If this
were the case, then what it is to be educated would not be the same across the board, there
being no single right answer to our first-order questions.
Now the literature is replete with many plausible, often incompatible, claims about the
ultimate aim(s) of education. Some maintain that the ultimate purpose of education is the
socialisation of the individual with a view to the preservation (or imposition) of civic
harmony. Others emphasise individual emancipation and ‘soul making’. Artistic creativity
has its champions, as does the promotion of scientific progress. Empowering individuals to
choose wisely is a particularly popular aim in modern democracies. And there are always
defenders of the idea that education is primarily about preparing citizens for the work-
place.2 These differing assessments of the basic aim(s) of education lead to significantly
different curricular priorities and to significantly different views of what it is to be edu-
cated. And so it is perhaps not surprising that—beyond the oft repeated and obviously
correct insistence on the importance of literacy and numeracy3 —the literature betrays no
consensus on what one needs to know, or be able to do, in order to be educated. Rather
‘‘conservatives’’ and ‘‘progressives’’ continue to argue over whether education is primarily
about the transmission of knowledge or about the fostering of personal autonomy; about
preparing students for the workplace and citizenship or about their personal development
and transformation; about the maintenance of class structures or promoting social change.4
2 See Rorty’s (1998) for discussion of the various stances taken by philosophers on education.
3 Although it is perhaps worth noting that it was not ever thus. In his remarks about what should be taught
and learned the enormously influential Islamic thinker, al-Ghazali, wrote the following about mathematics:
‘‘One should restrain anyone who would immerse himself in these mathematical sciences. For even though
they do not pertain to the domain of religion, yet, since they are among the foundations of the philosopher’s
science, the student will be infected with the evil and corruption of the philosophers. There are few,
therefore, who immerse themselves in mathematics without being stripped of their religion and having the
bridle of godly fear removed from their heads.’’ (The Faith and Practice of Al-Ghazali, trans. W. M. Watt.
London: Allen and Unwin 1953, p. 34. Found in Continuity and Innovation in Medieval and Modern
Philosophy, Marenbon (2013, 105). One can imagine similar remarks being made today about any western
foundational discipline.
4 A sympathetic commentator has written the following about the standard conservative educationalist: For
conservatives ‘‘the main mission of schools is to indoctrinate the young in the moral values of the great
tradition. One rarely encounters a conservative educator who believes in providing students with oppor-
tunities for change and innovation. Since they disregard issues such as plurality, individual creativity,
critical citizenry, these educators… cannot contribute much to the current debate on democratic education’’
(Mordechai 2005, 161). A clear expression of the progressive tendency, perhaps taken to its extreme, can be
168 S. Boulter
123
To complicate matters, some insist that we should not be forced to choose, and that we
should adopt an ‘‘all of the above’’ approach to education.5 But whatever the merits of
these answers, they are inevitably linked, at least in the eyes of their detractors, to com-
peting political or social ideologies. The temptation to cynicism and anti-realism in the
philosophy of education follows quickly on the realisation that educational priorities are
‘‘interested’’.6 It is easy to see why some have determined that these debates are irre-
solvable, riven as they are by deep ideological differences based on differing subjective
value judgments.7,8
Now philosophers in general are quite comfortable with the fact that there is rarely
anything approaching a consensus on the answers to first and second-order philosophical
questions. This sanguine attitude is usually entirely appropriate, it being difficult to say
exactly what of practical significance hangs on the outcome of debates regarding the nature
of reference, say, or one’s preferred theory of individuation. But educational matters are
not confined to recherche´ debates of academics. Answers to educational questions have a
real and lasting impact on the development of every individual put through a state run
educational system, as well as on the development of a nation’s economic standing. It is
this close connection with development, personal and national, which gives educational
matters an obvious moral seriousness that many philosophical questions lack. A sanguine
attitude to a lack of consensus in this context can look a lot like complacency.
That education is vital to development is not news. It is a commonplace amongst
economic historians,9 developmental economists,10 development ethicists,11 and
Footnote 4 continued
found in Gareth Mathews who maintains that ‘‘the central mission of the school should be to create spaces in
which children can articulate and explore their own interpretations of the world and bring these into dialogue
with others. Critical thinking means not so much instrumental problem-solving as the capacity and the
disposition to fantasise and to wonder, to entertain profound ideas about the world and to confront problems
concerning individual well-being’’ (Vansieleghem and Kennedy 2011, 175–6).
5 See David Carr (2010) as a case in point. This inclusive attitude to the aims of education is also evident in
The EU Lisbon Memorandum on Life-Long Learning 2000, which lists amongst its goals the promotion of
active citizenship, vocational skills, self-development and easy access to ‘good quality information’.
6 This is a well-worn line of thought going back to at least Plato’s Thracymachus. More recent versions of
this conflict theory of education are to be found in Marx, Bourdieu, Gramsci, Derrida, Foucault, who all
emphasise the idea that educational policy is a means of social control.
7 Wilfred Carr advances this view in his (2006).
8 Of course it is very easy to become cynical about this very cynicism, for reasons outlined in Boghossian’s
(2007) Fear of Knowledge.
9 Ever since Friedrich List’s (1841) The National System of Political Economy, the standard model of
development has included mass education as a key ingredient, along with building transportation infras-
tructure and a unified national market; imposition of tariffs on imported goods to protect national industries;
and chartering of banks to stabilize currencies and finance investment. These policies, adopted by the British
in the 19th century, and then copied by the Americans and Germans, and subsequently adapted to different
circumstances in Japan post WWII, lead to vastly improved standards of living.
10 Dasgupta is just one of many examples. He writes: ‘‘Throughout this book I have emphasized the
productive value of expenditure in infrastructure, primary and secondary education, the production and
spread of information, health care and potable water, and food and employment security. They are desirable
in themselves, but in addition they add to the productivity of labour, and so have a derived value as well’’
(1993, 538). Similarly the Copenhagen Consensus Project 2012 (Lomborg 2014), which prioritizes devel-
opmental aid proposals, found ‘‘16 investments worthy of investment’’, 3 of which, including the most
important, being a set of ‘‘Bundled interventions to reduce undernutrition in pre-schoolers.
11 Gasper (2004, 139) is typical of development ethicists in ranking education behind only security and
health (and alongside food, potable water, housing and access to health care) in his discussion of basic
needs. Gaspar (2004) The Ethics of Development. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
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educationalists themselves. And there has been a concerted effort amongst development
theorists of various disciplines to promote education as part of national development
programmes, to promote access to education for all at both primary and secondary levels,
and to encourage investment in teacher training and educational facilities.12 All of this is to
be warmly welcomed. But a familiar worry resurfaces when one delves into the devel-
opmental literature. What is it that an individual needs to know, or to be able to do, in order
to develop optimally? What does a society need to teach its members in order for that
society to develop in a desirable fashion? Even if we assume, as seems reasonable, that
‘‘development’’ at the level of the individual should be cashed out in terms of ‘‘capability
expansion’’, as suggested by, among others, Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, what do
teachers need to teach and what do students need to learn in order to expand their (relevant)
capabilities? And how would one justify one’s claims in this domain? Given the impor-
tance of education to development, one might reasonably expect development theorists to
have some rather specific ideas regarding curricular priorities. But one would be wrong.
Beyond the familiar consensus on the importance of literacy and numeracy, the devel-
opment literature is surprisingly mute on curricular questions.13
Several possible explanations for this lacuna in the development literature suggest
themselves. Development theorists might have decided, not unreasonably, that the initial
focus of their efforts has to be on making the case for universal education as a govern-
mental priority, the actual content of that education (beyond basic literacy and numeracy)
being of secondary important. Or perhaps the core of the curriculum is taken for granted. It
might be assumed, for example, that basic literacy and numeracy are propaedeutic to
studies in the sciences and engineering, the latter forming the core of the advanced cur-
riculum. Or perhaps development theorists are not committed to anything more than lit-
eracy and numeracy, and feel that the rest of the curriculum is best left to educationalists.
But it is also possible that development theorists avoid being more specific about the
curriculum because they are fully aware of the sensitivities involved, and that what it is to
be educated is highly contested.14 And no doubt matters are complicated by the fact that
12 Happily it would appear that these efforts have been largely successful. Banerjee and Duflo write: ‘‘Most
national governments seem to have bought into this idea. In India, 98 % of children now have a school
within a half mile or so. Several African countries… have made primary education free, and children have
flooded the schools.…In our eighteen-country data set, even among the extremely poor (those who live on
less than 99 cents a day), enrolment rates are now above 80 % in at least half the countries for which we
have data (Poor Economics, p. 73–4)’’.
13 It is always difficult to establish a negative. It will have to suffice to point to important documents in the
development literature and note the absence of discussion of curricular matters. Dasgupta (1993) for
example, we find the following: ‘‘…I am thinking of education in a very specific way, as acquiring
knowledge of other places, people, opportunities, and the natural world, and of reading and writing, and
numerical skills and so forth. More generally, I am thinking of the acquiring of a certain attitude towards
others and the world, one that imparts a distinct form of self-confidence, and encourages a judicious mix of
conscious and trained reflection and experimentation top improve ways of doing things, and of under-
standing things’’ (An Inquiry into Well-Being and Destitution. Oxford: OUP, p. 98). The bulk of Dasgupta’s
discussion is devoted to the empirical evidence regarding the benefits of education, with no more said about
the curriculum itself. In another more recent example, the 2006 UNESCO report entitled ‘‘Higher Education
in South-East Asia’’, produced by the Asia Pacific Programme of Educational Innovation for Development,
covers a vast array of topics without touching on curricular issues at all. (Topics covered are: Higher
Education reforms; Access to Higher Education; Diversity in Higher Education; University governance and
management; Restructuring of faculties and academic progress; Developing research capabilities; Changes
to the academic profession; Roles and function of private Higher Education; Internationalisation of Higher
Education; Accreditation and quality assurance; Challenges and future developments).
14 As the campaign picture referred to above makes abundantly clear. The point is precisely that the
Confederation of Kitchwa Peoples of Ecuador would have us reject the educational assumptions of the man
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education, particularly Western education, is frequently seen as a threat to traditional ways
of life, and positively resisted.15 One might hazard a guess that many development the-
orists prefer to avoid controversy and focus instead on those aspects of the curriculum
which enjoy widespread support. But whatever the explanation, given the importance of
education to development, at some point development theorists will need a philosophy of
the curriculum that can be defended in a multicultural and global context.
This position paper presents such a philosophy of the curriculum. It sets out to defend an
unusual answer to the fundamental question of what it is to be educated, and does so
without relying on contentious political or social ideology, or subjective value judgments.
The crucial first step, I suggest, is to consider approaching our first-order questions from a
different perspective with a view to casting well-worn terrain in a new and hopefully
revealing light. The central claim of this paper is that a biological perspective generates a
distinct picture of education which suggests: (1) contra widespread opinion, that the
purpose or function of education is neither a subjective matter or ‘‘socially constructed’’;
and (2) that progressive and conservative educationalists and philosophers alike have
hitherto failed to correctly characterise the fundamental purpose of educational activities.
This means one can reject the familiar but false progressive/conservative dichotomies, and
qualify the half-truths on which they are based. This biologically based picture also affords
an objective rationale for a set of curricular priorities, and provides the framework nec-
essary to draw principled distinctions between education, training, indoctrination, and
enculturation.
The next section begins with a brief apology for adopting the biological point of view
before going on to present a case for the claim that educational activities are a crucial
phenotypic adaption of Homo sapiens keyed to the maintenance of homeostasis. This
biological fact in view, I then go on in the following section to characterise the funda-
mental aim of education, specify what it is to be educated, and identify a set of curricular
priorities. Here the key claim is that Homo sapiens maintains homeostasis by the inten-
tional teaching and learning of behaviours that allow individuals to participate in the
running and maintenance of the social order to which they happen to belong. The con-
clusion of this section is that one is able to participate in the running and maintenance of
the social order when one is fully versed in the fundamentals of one’s social order, familiar
with the relative merits of alternative social orders, and so in a position to make reasonable
judgments about proposed changes to one’s social order with a view to the common good.
This is what it is to be educated. In the final section I revisit the familiar progres-
sive/conservative dichotomies, and briefly address some obvious objections to this bio-
logically based picture of education.
Footnote 14 continued
in the bulldozer, assumptions they see as providing spurious justification of actions taken in the name of
‘‘development’’.
15 It is important to realise that it is not just extremists like Boko Haram or the Taliban who feel this threat.
Many groups in Nigeria, for instance, who are otherwise unsympathetic to Boko Haram, are uneasy about
western education. See The Economist, ‘‘Education in northern Nigeria: Mixing the modern and the tra-
ditional’’, July 26, 2014. Similar stories of unease and positive resistance are to be found in the histories of
virtually every country which consciously attempted to ‘‘modernise’’, Russia under the Tsars, and Turkey
under Kemal Ataturk being instructive cases in point.
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Education from a Biological Point of View
So far I have been at pains to suggest that a coherent philosophy of the curriculum with a
warrant to widespread acceptance is to be highly welcomed. Such a philosophy of the
curriculum is currently lacking. The remainder of this paper is an attempt to begin to
address this lacuna.
The suggestion is to begin by adopting an unusual point of view.16 I suggest that one
begin by asking why it is that Homo sapiens devotes so much time and energy to edu-
cational activities compared with other species. This biological orientation affords a dis-
tinct perspective on education that abstracts from the familiar ideological concerns. This
turn to biology will strike many as counter-intuitive, so a few apologetic words are in
order.
It is often a fruitful methodological procedure, particularly when engaging in a long-
standing debate, to take a step back from the fray and consider the terrain from an entirely
different point of view. Often both sides of a seemingly intractable dispute are prey to the
same unexamined and mistaken assumption about the subject matter in question, and it is
our failure to notice this shared mistake which prevents us from realising that both sides of
the dispute are in error. I believe that something like this has happened in education.
Progressives and conservatives alike share the common assumption that education is pri-
marily a socio-cultural matter within the domain of value judgments. This is perhaps most
clearly seen in the ‘‘culture wars’’ over whether education is primarily about indoctrinating
the young in a society’s moral traditions with a view to preserving them or the fostering of
a critical attitude to these same traditions with a view to social change. But education is
more accurately seen as our species specific strategy for dealing with a challenge faced by
all living creatures. If we adopt the comparative method of biology, and compare traits and
behaviours across distinct species the better to understand them in each, it emerges that, at
bottom, educational activities are—as a matter of fact, and not of value—our species’
solution to a biological problem. Failure to recognise the biological point or function of
educational activities results in a distorted picture of the core purpose of education, and
thus to distorted curricular priorities.17 A few biological reminders are essential to this
approach to education. Those reminders in place, we can then proceed to consider the
curriculum from a biological point of view.
The Biological Context
I take it as axiomatic that the issue regarding what should be prioritised in the curriculum
cannot be addressed in a principled fashion until one has a settled opinion on the over-
arching aim of education.18 A corollary of this is obvious: If there is no objective core aim
16 The view to be defended here does have precursors. See section 1 of Chapter 1 of John Dewey’s (1966)
Democracy and Education. William James also recommends the adoption of ‘‘the biological conception’’ in
educational matters in ‘‘The Child as Behaving Organism’’ in his (2014) Talks to Teachers on Psychology.
17 No doubt some will insist that one cannot ‘‘read off’’ educational priorities from biological facts since
this is to fall prey to the naturalistic fallacy. But this is to assume that one’s educational priorities are always
a matter of subjective judgement, and this is to beg the question against my case. I am arguing that curricular
priorities are not a matter of value but of fact, and so it remains to be seen if the facts of biology can speak to
educational matters.
18 This is simply a specific instance of the general rule that the success or otherwise of any activity or
practice is ‘‘measured’’ by reference to its point. This rule is unaffected by the claim that education is an end
in itself (Peters 1973) a claim made by those wishing to ensure that education not be exclusively vocational.
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of education then there is no objective set of curricular priorities. So the crucial question is:
Why do we engage in educational activities? What is the purpose of this behaviour?
Of course the answers to this question are multi-faceted, and context dependent. But for
all the variability one finds in the proximate reasons for engaging in educational activities,
one ultimate explanation emerges if one adopts a biological perspective. The first step is to
consider Homo sapiens as just another species that needs to cope with all the challenges
biological reality throws at it.
Most of these challenges are perfectly familiar. All organisms have to find a way of
reproducing their kind. And all organisms need to find a way of avoiding danger in what is
usually not an utterly benign environment. But more prosaically, all organisms must
maintain homeostasis. Homeostasis is the term used to describe a stable internal envi-
ronment of an organism which affords normal physiological functioning. Significant
departures from this internal environment constitute illness, and ultimately lead to death if
not rectified.
Homeostasis is achieved in various ways across the various Kingdoms of organisms, but
one can set aside here consideration of the prokaryotae, the protoctista, the fungi and the
plantae (whose ways of life are significantly different from our own) and focus attention on
our Kingdom, the animalia. Achieving homeostasis in animals, and more specifically in
mammals such as ourselves, includes maintaining blood sugar levels, maintaining the
appropriate concentration of respiratory gases in the blood stream and tissues, maintaining
blood pressure and body temperature, as well as normal levels of calcium, magnesium,
potassium and various other minerals. Maintaining this constant internal environment in
the face of variable external conditions is in large part a matter of the animal securing its
resource requirements from the external environment. The basic resource requirements of
Homo sapiens are clean air, food and water, skins or fibres (clothing), fuel (heating and
cooking) and building materials (shelter).19 Without these external resources it is impos-
sible for a human being to maintain her internal environment on a secure basis, secure
enough, that is, to be able to consider other biological challenges (like finding a mate) or
spend time on any other activities. A similar set of resource requirements can be identified
for all animals.
One might be forgiven for wondering what these facts of biology have to do with
education. The connection becomes apparent when one considers how an animal achieves
homeostasis. At the highest level of abstraction, it is by means of actions that form
behaviour patterns that an animal meets the challenge of homeostasis. An animal achieves
homeostasis by engaging in a suite of behaviours, frequently but not always species
specific, by means of which it is able to secure its resource requirements from the external
environment. In ethnographic circles these suites of behaviours are known as ‘‘extended
phenotypes’’.20 These behaviours are of great biological importance because an animal’s
viability depends as much on its ability to execute these behaviours as upon any purely
anatomical feature. The crucial point for present purposes, however, is that the different
behaviours or suites of behaviour of different species can be compared and contrasted as
different ways of dealing with the fundamentally the same problem.
Again one might be forgiven for wondering what this has to do with education, but the
connection is not far to seek. A fundamental challenge facing any animal is mastering the
suite of behaviours by means of which resource requirements are secured. How does a
nesting bird, say, acquire the skills necessary for nest building? Similar questions can be
19 These are the so-called Malthusian necessities of life.
20 Konrad Lorenz’ (1937) is the root source for this insight.
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asked about the spider’s web, or the beaver’s dam.21 The answer appears to be that the
necessary behaviour patterns in non-human animals are largely innate. The acquiring of
nest building skills in birds is akin to the growing of teeth in human infants—it is chan-
nelized into the developmental programme of the animal, and happens naturally as long as
everything else is taken care of, with no intentional action required on the part of the adult
or infant.22
The case of humans is markedly different. We have certain relevant behaviours that are
similarly instinctual (breathing and suckling are obvious cases in point). But the vast
majority of the behaviours necessary to secure our resource requirements are not
instinctive. What is particularly conspicuous about us as a species is that our behaviour
patterns have to be intentionally taught and learned. In fact Homo sapiens is the only
species whose viability depends on one generation teaching the next, for the necessary
information regarding behaviour patterns is not inherited along with eye colour and the
like, nor can that information be rediscovered anew in each generation. Our way of life
depends on knowledge and technology of such complexity that such rediscovery or re-
invention is impossible. The practice of education is thus a biological necessity for Homo
sapiens. We as a species are biologically committed to a way of life that depends on skills
and knowledge that must be taught, the learning of which takes years. Our current pop-
ulation levels, our current ecological range, and our current standard(s) of living23 are
made possible only because the knowledge and skills needed to support this way of life are
systematically passed on from generation to generation, now more than ever in the form of
formal state-run educational programmes. That this is true today is obvious; but it was ever
thus, although the necessary information and technology has not always been as copious as
it is today. In the Pleistocene a youth had to be taught how to make the tools necessary for
successful hunting. A youth had to be shown how to start a fire, how to build a dwelling,
how to mend a garment. Although there were no classrooms, intentional vertical and
horizontal teaching and learning were vital to our way of life.
To use the jargon of ethnography, educational behaviour is our species’ most important
extended phenotypic adaptation. If one is to understand education, one has to remember its
core biological function. So the answer to our initial question, ‘‘Why do Homo sapiens
devote so much time and energy on educational activities?’’ is: ‘‘We have to. It is by means
of intentional teaching and learning that we achieve mastery of the suite of behaviours
deployed to secure the resources necessary to achieve homeostasis. Other animals do this
instinctively; we don’t.’’24
21 These are just particularly vivid examples of complex behaviours animals engage in in their efforts to
meet the challenge of homeostasis.
22 Animal infants are often given the opportunity to practice a skill, and an infant might observe an adult
performing a particular action, washing a potato in salt water, say; but there is little to no evidence that there
is intentional vertical or horizontal teaching and learning in non-human animals.
23 Measured by the Human Development Index employed by the UN which focuses on life expectancy,
morbidity rates, infant/mother mortality rates, nutritional intake, access to potable water, clothing, shelter,
security, education, and GDP—note that the biological significance of these factors is fairly obvious.
24 Notice that this argument would not be affected if it turned out that another non-human species engaged
in educational activities as well. At issue is how we achieve mastery of the necessary suite of behaviours.
We must learn them, and so the biological function of education in humans is to meet this need. It need not
be unique to our species in much the same way as the function of teeth in humans remains mastication
despite the fact that teeth play the same role in other species.
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To summarise:
1. For an organism to be viable it must be able to maintain homeostasis (a universal
biological imperative).
2. Homeostasis is achieved in animals in significant part by their engaging in a suite of
behaviours by means of which they are able to secure their resource requirements.
3. Mastery of this suite of behaviours appears to be innate in non-human animals. That is,
the behaviour appears to be channelized as part of the developmental programmes of
non-human animal species.
4. The vast majority of resource acquiring behaviour in Homo sapiens in not channelized.
5. Resource acquiring behaviour is taught and learned in Homo sapiens.
6. A comparison across species brings to attention the fact that education is the master
behaviour in the suite of behaviours that forms our species specific strategy for
maintaining homeostasis. Education is a species specific phenotypic adaptation.
These observations are likely to meet with favour amongst biologists. Their response is
likely to be something like the following: Given the importance of meeting the biological
challenge, and given the value and reliability of vertical and horizontal intentional teaching
and learning, why do we not find more of it in the animal world?25 But many non-
biologists, while granting (1)–(5), will balk at the emphasis of (6). Many will want to say
that the fact that we engage in education is the very mark of our profound difference from
non-human animals. That we engage in educational activities just goes to show that Homo
sapiens has elevated itself above the ‘merely’ biological by acquiring culture. Education,
they will say, is specifically human, and specifically cultural, and so there is little wonder
that it is not found in the rest of the animal world.
There is something profoundly right about this response, and something profoundly
wrong. It is right inasmuch as culture and education truly are outstanding features of Homo
sapiens. But this does not obviate the fact that education is how we deal with the biological
challenge—a challenge facing even culture bearing creatures such as ourselves—and that
if we desisted from educational activities the biological, not just cultural, implications
would be enormous.26
A better reply would be to suggest that while education might have been about meeting
the challenge of homeostasis in the Pleistocene, it is now about something else, in the same
way that feathers, say, might have been used to regulate body temperature when they first
appeared, but were then redeployed to aid flight. The reply to this line of thought is to grant
that educational activities have been turned to various other uses in the course of human
history; nonetheless, these uses must be seen as additional to, and not replacing, the
25 See Caro and Hauser (1992) ‘‘Is There Teaching in Nonhuman Animals?’’ as a case in point.
26 Consider our current numbers. The global population has been able to explode because we have learned
how to increase our food production, allowing us to produce enough food to support such numbers.
Agricultural innovations are responsible for this. Agricultural techniques of the Roman period, say, would
not be able to support current numbers. If we failed to pass this agricultural knowledge on to the next
generation there would be mass starvation and our numbers would plummet. Consider our moving from
tropical or temperate climates to the much colder parts of the globe. This continues to be possible in our
current numbers because we have learned to use fossil fuels for heating, and have learned how to extract
fossil fuels from inaccessible places underground, and how to transport such fuels great distances around the
globe. If the knowledge and skills involved in all of this were not passed on to the next generation, we could
not continue to live in the numbers we currently do outside the temperate zone, leading to mass migrations.
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fundamental purpose which remains ever the same. For education is the only way we can
master the behaviours necessary to maintain homeostasis.27,28
The Curriculum from a Biological Point of View
The upshot of the preceding section is this: Whatever else educational activities may be
for, the raison d’eˆtre of education is the teaching and learning of behaviour patterns
necessary to maintain homeostasis, skills that are innate in non-human animals. But what
are these skills that we need to teach and learn? If the preceding section is on the right
track, we can assume that these skills are keyed to our resource requirements, so we know
that they are the sorts of behaviours that secure food and water, skins or fibres, fuel, and
building materials. So at one point in human history, when individuals were far more
directly engaged in the procuring of these requirements from the environment than we are
today, teaching and learning would have focused on the hunting, gathering and growing of
food, shelter construction, etc., etc. But few people today, or for some considerable time,
obtain their resource requirements in the way we once did in the Pleistocene, i.e., by
engaging in behaviours that put them directly in contact with the external environment. No
one today grows all their own food, makes their own clothes out of fibres they themselves
have gathered or grown, while also gathering or producing the necessary building materials
with which to build their own house, while also mining, drilling or foraging for wood or
dung to get the materials with which to heat their house and cook their food. And the
reason for this is that meeting the challenge of homeostasis is increasingly a co-operative
venture in Homo sapiens, a joint venture in which a division of labour has reached a very
advanced stage indeed. The behaviours necessary to meet the challenge of homeostasis in
Homo sapiens are now widely dispersed and divided amongst members of our social order.
I do not grow my own wheat, say, and grind my own grain, and then bake my own bread in
order to have something to eat. I rely on the farmer, the miller and the baker, plus a myriad
other intermediaries, each with their own particular knowledge and skills, to produce bread
27 Here I am echoing James’ point regarding the primacy of the biological/practical over the cultural/
theoretical. He writes: ‘‘Deep in our own nature the biological foundations of our consciousness persist,
undisguised and undiminished. Our sensations are here to attract us or to deter us, our memories to warn or
encourage us, our feelings to impel, and our thoughts to restrain our behavior, so that on the whole we may
prosper and our days be long in the land. Whatever of transmundane metaphysical insight or of practically
inapplicable æsthetic perception or ethical sentiment we may carry in our interiors might at this rate be
regarded as only part of the incidental excess of function that necessarily accompanies the working of every
complex machine… I shall ask you now—not meaning at all thereby to close the theoretic question, but
merely because it seems to me the point of view likely to be of greatest practical use to you as teachers—to
adopt with me, in this course of lectures, the biological conception, as thus expressed, and to lay your own
emphasis on the fact that man, whatever else he may be, is primarily a practical being, whose mind is given
him to aid in adapting him to this world’s life (2014, Ch. 3).’’
28 Of course, another way of countering this argument is to deny the factual nature of propositions 1–5, and
to insist that they constitute mere ‘‘interpretations’’ of the biological order that one may or may not choose to
respect. If adoption of propositions 1–5 is optional, then one can avoid the conclusion by rejecting 1–5. The
idea here might be that all alleged facts are products of an interpretive process, and that there is no theory or
interpretation free observation. All that needs to be said about this here is that whether props 1–5 are the
product of an interpretative process is not to the point. At issue is whether there are mind-independent states
of affairs in virtue of which these interpretations are true or false. This is not the place to air arguments for
realism in biology. For such a discussion see Boulter (2004). In any case, to counter this argument one must
show either that there are no facts of biology because the biological order is not mind-independent (embrace
anti-realism in biology), or show that propositions 1–5 are false. Neither follows from the mere fact that 1–5
are the products of an interpretative process.
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I buy in my local store. We do not have to do everything ourselves (mercifully) because we
now secure the vast majority of our resource requirements from the external environment
indirectly by participating directly in the collective activities of the social order to which
we belong, an order which touches upon the external environment only at the periphery. To
put it picturesquely, the social order is to humans as the dam, web and nest are to beavers,
spiders and birds.
It is this social order within which individuals now operate directly that becomes the
focus of our attention, for each of us relies on the functioning of the social order to meet the
challenge of homeostasis. What are the operations of a social order? Following the lead of
sociologist Ernest Gellner, one can take the collective institutions and practices of any
social order to fall into three core categories: the productive/economic, the coercive/
political, and the cognitive/legitimative.29 A brief word on each is in order here. It is
obvious that every social order has to provide for the material needs of its members. It is
these productive activities which secure raw materials from the external environment, turn
these into finished goods for direct consumption, and eventually distribute these amongst
the members of the social order. In addition to a productive/economic sector, every society
has to have some mechanism by mean of which it arrives at decisions regarding the
collective activities of the social order. This is the politico/coercive dimension of the social
order. Finally, every social order has to have a method by means of which it arrives at
authoritative knowledge claims about the world in which we make our way. This is the
cognitive, or knowledge producing and legitimating sector of the social order. Every social
order has to find some way of carrying out these functions, and distinct social orders can be
characterised by the different ways in which these functions are carried out.30
Now, viewed from this perspective, it becomes apparent that the ultimate purpose of
education per se is to prepare individuals for participation in the running and maintenance
of the social order to which they happen to belong. With this in mind it becomes clear what
constitutes an education, and what needs to be prioritised in the curriculum. First, to be
educated just is to have acquired the knowledge and skills necessary to be able to par-
ticipate in the running and maintenance of the social order to which one belongs. But
although what constitutes ‘‘being educated’’ is the same for all, the particulars of the
knowledge and skill set to be acquired will be as diverse as the social orders to which
individuals belong. Second, achieving competency in the set of practices and institutions
that comprise one’s social order is what needs to be prioritized in the curriculum—ev-
erything else that is taught and learned are additions to this core of the curriculum.
Now preparing individuals to participate in the running of the social order is in effect to
prepare individuals for the workplace. No social order will last if it lacks individuals
competent to carry out the functions of the various orders of society. So the curriculum
29 See chapter 1 of Gellner’s (1988). This division of the social order goes back to at least Plato’s Republic,
but also famously features in Adalberon of Loan’s Carmen ad Rotbertum regem where he separates society
into the three estates: oratores, bellatores and laboratores. It is also echoes Talcott Parson’s categories of
‘‘goal-attainment’’ (the coercive/political), ‘‘adaptation’’ (the productive) and ‘‘integration’’ (cognitive/le-
gitimative) although it does leave unmentioned Parson’s category of ‘‘latency’’ (motivating individuals to
adopt a role in one of these sub-systems). See Ch. 2 of Parson’s (1991), particularly the section entitled ‘‘The
Functional Prerequisites of Social Systems’’.
30 One might want to add a fourth function. It might be thought that every society needs some way of
maintaining the order in its existing forms in the three mentioned domains, a ‘stabiliser’ so to speak. There
might be a role here for customs, ethics and a legal system. No doubt such a stabilising force is required in a
society; but it is not clear that such a stabiliser need be additional to and independent of the political and
cognitive aspects of the social order.
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needs to reflect this. This is not a matter of conservative political ideology but simply a fact
about human societies grounded in biological realities.
But being prepared for the workplace, in whatever sector of the social order, is not yet to
be educated. One is trained when one has been adequately prepared to take on the
responsibilities of a role in the economic, political or cognitive orders.31 And while such
training is a crucial stage of one’s education, it is not the end. For the maintenance of the
social order requires more than the mere replacement of competent worker for competent
worker in all sectors of that order. A social order’s medium-to-long-term viability depends
on its ability to make appropriate adjustments to changing circumstances in order to
maintain and hopefully improve the standard of living of all its members.32 This is the
sociological analogue of biological adaptation. But the point for present purposes is that an
ossified social order, accepted uncritically, and stubbornly conserved in the face of new
circumstances, is destined for the scrap heap of history, and, before it ultimately collapses,
will consigned its members to less than optimal living conditions. So the curriculum needs
to reflect this. This is not a matter of progressive political ideology but simply a fact about
human societies grounded in biological realities.
Now the need to be able to make appropriate adjustments to the social order poses a
particular challenge, because not all change is in the long term interests of the social order,
and by extension, is not in the long term interests of individuals trying to meet the
challenge of homeostasis. In order to distinguish appropriate adjustments from policy
mistakes the members of a viable social order responsible for introducing changes need to
be familiar with the key elements of their current social order and how these elements are
interwoven to create a viable (if always less than optimal) whole. It is also necessary that
these members be aware of alternative social orders (both possible and actual) and the
relative merits of each so as to be in the best possible position to make improvements to the
existing order whenever the need/opportunity arises. This, on the view being defended
here, is what it is to be educated, and it is this which most clearly distinguishes education
from indoctrination. When one is fully versed in the fundamentals of one’s social order,
and when one is familiar with the relative merits of alternative economic, political and
cognitive orders, then one is in a position to make reasonable judgments about proposed
changes to one’s social order with a view to the common good. Then, and only then, is one
educated.
With these points in mind let us now turn to the social order of Western democratic
societies in which the general population has a say via elections regarding how our society
is run. Three broad topics come into view as core elements of the curriculum. The cur-
riculum in a democratic society ought to prioritize (1) understanding the fundamentals, as
well as the merits and demerits, of representational political systems (and the alternatives
as known from other contemporary societies and history); (2) understanding the
31 This applies to all professions, from janitor, to hairdresser, to surgeon, to diplomat, to scientist to banker.
32 Two points are worth making here, if only in a footnote. First, whatever one’s political stripe, all parties
agree that the institutions of our social order are responsible to the community at large and the well-being of
all its members. Even neo-conservatives have come to accept that this progressive agenda is now mandatory
for any political movement that hopes for electoral success in the West. See Michael William’s (2007).
Second, while there are outstanding issues to be resolved about what constitutes well-being, the basic non-
moral goods or prerequisites are clear enough. The uncontentious elements of human well-being are those
adopted by the United Nations Human Development Index as the criteria for measuring social development.
These include access to adequate nutrition, potable water, serviceable clothing, shelter, education, health
care and security. Measurable criteria of successful national development include increase in life expectancy
at birth, decrease in infant/mother mortality rates, decrease in morbidity rates, increase in literacy and
numeracy, per capita income and gender empowerment.
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fundamentals, as well as the merits and demerits, of exchange economies (and the alter-
natives, both historical and actual); and (3) a sound grasp of the sciences, particularly the
STEM subjects, and scientific method in general—since the sciences play the role of the
cognitive/legitimiser in the West (and the alternatives). If one is not versed in these three
areas, and matters propaedeutic to these, one is simply not in a position to participate fully
in the running and maintenance of the social order—whatever else one may know and be
able to do. For our current social order is characterised precisely by its commitment to
these three pillars.
The Progressive/Conservative Dichotomies Revisited
I want to end with some remarks on both the merits of, and likely objections to, this
biologically based approach to education. In what is essentially a position paper it is not
possible to deal with either at any length; but a brief word is useful if only to underline the
point that the results of this approach to education are not arbitrary. Nor are they pre-
fabricated to suit any ideological disposition that may be at issue between progressives and
conservatives.
Perhaps the first point is that this approach allows for plausible distinctions to be drawn
between education, training, and indoctrination. As stated above, one is educated when one
is fully versed in the fundamentals of one’s social order and when one is familiar with the
relative merits of alternative economic, political and cognitive orders. The mark of the
educated person is a particular capacity, viz., the ability to make reasonable judgments
about proposed changes to the social order with a view to the common good. By contrast
one is trained if one has acquired the knowledge and skills necessary to fulfil the
responsibilities of a role in the economic, political or cognitive sectors of the social order.
Finally, one is indoctrinated in a particular domain if one has not been exposed to the
possible or actual alternative orders in that domain, undercutting one’s ability to make
responsible judgments about the merits and demerits of the order to which one belongs.
Second, it goes without saying that literacy and numeracy, being propaedeutic to all
advanced study, are crucial components of any sensible curriculum. Nothing on the picture
of education being offered here contradicts this truism. More important is that the emphasis
placed on the STEM subjects will strike many as entirely appropriate, particularly those
whose main concerns are development and employment related. One is simply not an
educated Western European if one does not have a grasp of the fundamentals of the basic
theories of physics, chemistry and biology, and, perhaps just as importantly, of scientific
methodology. However, I also take it to be a point in favour of this picture of education
that by its lights there is more to being educated than achieving proficiency in STEM
subjects.
Third, the insistence on economic literacy will cause alarm, but not because there is any
serious doubt that a sound education ought to include this competency. The worries are
probably twofold. First, many who consider themselves educated will have to reconsider
that assessment, since so few people in Western societies are economically literate. Sec-
ond, there is the worry that economics is such a contested domain that it will be difficult to
determine which economic doctrines ought to be taught, or worse, that a particularly
narrow form of ‘‘orthodox’’ economics will become dominant. This is a pressing point,
particularly so since the crash of 2008 has raised serious concerns about the state of
academic economics in English speaking countries. But this is not a legitimate complaint
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against the position defended here, since to be economically literate demands that one be
aware of the fundamentals of one’s own economic order and the alternatives. Similar
remarks apply to politics.
Fourth, the demand that one be aware of alternatives to one’s social order means that
there is an obvious place for the historical disciplines. Historical studies reveal alternative
orders we have previously occupied, and provide the brute data required for comparative
judgments. Of course scientific, political and economic histories receive pride of place on
this picture of education. For similar reasons comparative studies of other societies (so-
ciology and anthropology) are crucial if one is to be in the best position to make informed
judgments about possible alternatives to one’s current social order. This will include
alternatives to our current cognitive order, presently dominated by the sciences. To fully
appreciate the relative merits of our commitment to the sciences one needs to be aware of
other putative ways of knowing that have been, and continue to be relied upon. This means
that the fully educated person will have to have some familiarity with traditional religious
modes of thought if only, as Mill might have put it, so as to more fully appreciate the
significant achievement that is enshrined in standard scientific method.
One further discipline is vital on this picture of education, although it might not be
immediately obvious. Philosophical reflection, at least as traditionally conceived, begins
when one notices tensions or outright contradictions in the lines of thought one is pre-
theoretically disposed to find plausible.33 More often than not these lines of thought
include basic assumptions that underpin the three sectors of the social order. Assessing the
merits and demerits of one’s entire social order (particularly with a view to its internal
coherence) and making comparative judgments between alternative orders (possible and
actual) requires a second-order level of critical reflection which is characteristic of phi-
losophy. Achieving some degree of philosophical sophistication is therefore a necessary
element of being educated.
One final point in favour of this approach to education is that it provides an over-arching
framework within which these various disciplines find their place and their specific con-
tribution to the educational project. At a time when ‘‘inter-disciplinarity’’ is in vogue, such
a framework is potentially very valuable. The relations between disciplines are not always
obvious, and it is not always easy to see how all are part of a single intellectual endeavour.
The biological point of view offers a way of organising and co-ordinating these disciplines
in a coherent fashion.
It is clear that being educated is rather demanding, but again I think this is a point in
favour of this picture. Being educated is a matter of degree, and one can always become
more fully educated than one already is. But that a level of competence in the productive,
political and cognitive sectors of one’s social order is deemed necessary to qualify as
educated will strike many as plausible. But some more or less obvious objections to this
picture of education are not far to seek:
First, on this view education is not aimed primarily at individual salvation, personal
autonomy, soul making, or the spiritual benefits beloved of the liberal tradition. While
there is nothing inherently illiberal or ‘anti-progressive’ about this view, individual sal-
vation understood in this sense is at best a secondary aim of education as understood from
the biological point of view. That said, personal growth and development are more than
likely to be achieved, if only incidentally, in the course of meeting the primary aims of
education as understood here.
33 For extended discussion and defence of this meta-philosophy see Ch. 1 of Boulter (2007).
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Second, preserving a reasonable degree of civil harmony is crucial to the viability of the
social order, and an educational system must recognise this. But civil harmony per se
cannot be the ultimate goal of education because harmony will have to be compromised, if
only in the short term, when, inevitably, changes to the social order are required. Change
always disrupts some vested interests, and being able to make sensible judgments about the
accommodation and disappointment of competing interests is part of what it is to be
educated. This means that neither the maintenance of class structures nor the promoting of
social change per se can be taken to be the ultimate aim of education.
Third, on this view knowledge transmission is a crucial aspect of one’s education, but it
is not the final end either. Knowledge transmission is more about training than education
per se. For ultimately the mark of the educated person is being able to make sensible
judgments about proposed changes to the social order, and this requires not just a
knowledge base but critical thinking and evaluative skills which are not simply a matter of
information. It is also worth pointing out that not all knowledge is equally relevant to such
judgements.
But perhaps most concerning will be the objection that important domains have been
passed over. The most obvious perhaps are the various arts. On the view defended here,
literature, drama, music, painting, and sculpture are matters of enculturation, not education
per se, unless they are pursued with a view to gainful employment in the entertainment
business or some other professional capacity, in which case their study would constitute a
form of training. Alternatively they might be taken to be revelatory of social orders other
than our own, as one might read the Classics of Ancient Greece and Rome. No doubt this
will strike some as an unacceptable result, and some will take it as a reductio of the
position defended here. The best response to this objection is to insist that there is much of
value that is not best seen as a core element of the curriculum. Sport, and other forms of
play, is an example of an important life-enhancing activity which finds no natural place in
this picture of education. But as long as the term ‘‘education’’ is not taken to be a catch-all,
feel-good term which must embrace every life-enhancing activity—from the appreciation
of fine cuisine to acquiring a detailed knowledge of the history of ballet—and as long as
priorities have to identified, the mere fact that something of value is not recognised as core
to educational activities should not be taken as a reductio in and of itself. But most
importantly, however ‘‘philistine’’ such a view of the arts might be, it is not arbitrary, nor
the result of a subjective value judgment or ideological parti pris.
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